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For many years now – and its just crazy that I can say that about this podcast at this stage – I’ve been saying the social sector is filled with lots of very smart, well educated people who truly want to lift up others in pursuit of greater human flourishing. Almost always, this is a fantastic thing, I mean, having intelligent, thoughtful people on your team is something we all wish for. But, at the same time, something I’ve also noticed over my career is that when we create teams with many highly intelligent, ambitious, motivated people… those teams often miss the forest for the trees. Reports that could be 2 or 3 pages end up being 100 page tomes, people dive deep into their passions or niches and often have trouble seeing how their initiatives are interconnected with others and, as has been so often pointed out on just this show alone, we frequently forget to just listen to the very people and communities we’re trying to serve. One area where this rings true is in the area of planning. We plan so we can measure. We plan so we can articulate the theory behind the change we expect to see. We plan because of budget cycles and resource allocations. We plan so much that sometimes – and no, I’m not kidding here – we forget to “do”. This partially why phrases often associated with places like silicon valley – things like innovation, iteration and fail fast – have become such buzzwords around the social sector. So, what if it was your job to lead a US Government Agency that had to operate without a plan and literally embrace the unknown to achieve foreign policy objectives? For most of the people I know in our sector, this would be highly undesirable. Now, this isn’t a value statement, this is just common sense – most of us look for stability, predictability and minimal risk in what is otherwise a unique career choice. But for people like Stephen Lennon, my guest for the 171st Terms of Reference Podcast, delivering positive outcomes in turbulent situations is his sweet spot. Stephen is the Director of the Office of Transition Initiatives for the US Government. OTI helps local partners advance peace and democracy by providing fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs. If your like me – or really any shade of an Aidpreneur – you’re going to love this conversation about how OTI operates, how they innovate on the fly in situations across the globe and why sometimes not having a plan is the best plan of all. You can connect with Stephen here: https://www.linkedin.com/in/stephen-lennon-b602472/ Tweets by Alcibides67

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IN TOR 171 YOU’LL LEARN ABOUT

• The Office of Transition Initiative at USAID, and its unique capabilities to attend unanticipated crisis around the world
• The value of contingency-based response in the A&D space, and how quick deployment should never replace but coexist with long-term institutional planning and “play nice”
• The importance of culture to guarantee quick learning, intervention and building outbound partnerships
• Why rural procurement in countries like Pakistan is perhaps the most effective counter insurgency operation
• Stephen’s team made of “specialized generalist” with leadership skills good enough to know to follow local experts and recognize what they do not know

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OUR CONVERSATION FEATURES THE FOLLOWING

Names:

• USAID
• USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
• US Department of State
• Pakistani Government
• The Taliban
• CNN
• Plutarch
• Shakespeare

Topics:

• Foreign Assistance
• Contingency environments
• 2015 Mali Peace Accords
• Organizational Learning, Culture
• Dealing with Authority, Bureaucracy
• Procuring, dynamics
• Fatwa
• Intelligence, Security, Counter-insurgency
• Communication, Miscommunication
• Global conflicts, evolving landscape
• Risk, aversion
• Anonymous Hotlines, reporting
• Big Data

Places:

• Mali
• Pakistan
• Algiers, Algeria
• Washington, DC
• Afghanistan

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EPISODE CRIB NOTES

Download an automated transcript. Washington, DC, Mid-August   2-year US Office of Transition Initiatives at USAID director 04:20 Unique capabilities for foreign assistance, policy “I’m a cheerleader for OTI” “When we get involved, we bring a unique talent and capability” 2000 different activities per ears in 15 places Contingency environments Not anticipated by foreign policy 2015 Mali Coup d’Etat US Wanted Peace Accords signed on site OTI got it done Published the accords in “most” Mali languages Disseminated them, held rallies Sent Malian journalists to Algiers to report on them Accords were signed   Why is OTI not something else? 06:42 OTI is a “Contingency organization” “We act as we move” “We innovate as we go” “We learn from small things” High learning (expensive) “We embrace the unknown” Notwithstanding authority Bureau people handles bureaucracy so people on the field can act quickly Can deploy people easier anywhere Years of perfecting a management structure High interaction with implementation partners And “a culture of people excited about the mission” Religious about the “one team” idea: people on the field, implementers, DC team Goals objectives change constantly. “It means you are getting better at what you do”   Size and breadth 10:18 Upwards of 200 staffed, 225 maximum Many in DC, “critical” Staff on the field are focused on the program “Inverse model” Removing burdens on the field to have “more time with the partner” US gives them money OTI acquires competence to develop dynamic procuring platforms “Different in every context”   I’ll listen to one story 13:17 2007 Pakistan DOS wanted an Afghanistan surge Connection between Pakistani government and rural areas was cut off by the Taliban OIT needed to clear the swamp Worked with procurement arm of the Pakistani government working with rural Fatwas OTI restored government services, Pakistan now controlled 80% up from 10% With foreign military “is innovative” Most successful counter-insurgency operation   If you listen to this conversation, they will hunt you down 14:57 “It was about 3,000 different small activities” that reconnected people with their government Cooperation with population OTI restores markets and roads, small and not costly But the important thing was community consensus Requiring all parts to sit down and argue “What is needed to help?” It was the most important   There has to be some form of system 16:13 Communication, and other generally good practices Relationships between teams and parties US government is always trying to plan No specialists, “specialized generalists” People ready to react, and to follow local experts Leaders must admit they don’t know what to do Be able to tell the US government there’s no answer “We go there first to learn” Changing objectives, keep on listening OTI Practice training, “rigorous” Once OTI is in, local experts are hired quickly, whenever possible Hires always follow dialogue “We have a lot of systems” There is always a larger context People thinking they know what to do are usually not a good match “Not a personality test” as it is a US agency which cannot ask such questions at hiring “We can’t ask people if they walk up escalators”   Are you good with people? 22:28 Dismissing people is not a good idea Quality of work is a great way to introduce “We play really well” with DC offices. It’s key There is a big lack of understanding “Understandable” but conflicting “We believe in our ignorance” Innovating is listening to local actors People not understanding OTI is OTI’s greatest weakness It’s hard to talk about miscommunication “OTI fails when it’s involved in long-term development” Development is not bad, it’s just that “we’re bad at it” OTI once tried long-term development, turn talent and resources into it Which fails   How to know when not to scale 25:33 Used to have a rule: Leave in 2 years Program evolves In Pakistan for more than a decade It’s harder to leave than to enter Involved with OTI for more than 2 decades “Internet has greatly improved our ability to communicate” Closing space around the world The environment of conflict has changed Many actors, sides not always clear “Hyper risk aversion” contrary to contingency examples (No American seen on any Pakistani fatwa) Monitoring triangulation Anonymous hotlines for projects: corruption, misbehaving   All more barriers are cultural 29:02 The criteria to get in differs each time Sometimes a government official, a partner, “sometimes CNN” Sometimes, internal OTI workers Majority of implementing partners are used to doing things a certain way Unfamiliarity with OTI Country experts tend to have opinions “Really great and wonderful people” Prenup: Work 4 years in DC, next 4 abroad Ongoing discussion about standards v flexibility at OTI Government model People want more OTI across USAID “We try to do that” “I don’t know if our methods are applicable everywhere” “But we learn from each other” Also a great database, made with partners To govern grant process “We need to have open dialogues with partners all the time” “Hierarchy is the graveyard of innovation”   Matters of spending 34:18 OTI don’t come cheap Funding is complicated “Transition Initiatives” money only at OTI disposal Budget growth over 30% in since 2015 But after OTI gets in, partners continue the funding “There’s frequently enough money” OTI focuses on visible impact quicky Part of the calculus   Envisioning Management 36:13 First job: Making 45th administration understand OTI Then, evolve within Opportunities in redesigning the government Restructuring “I’ll be a participant”   Wondering what a guy like Stephen’d read 37:11 Plutarch Shakespeare “Get lots of ideas” Big Data

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